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Abstract 
Fuenterrabía (Hondarribia) is a town located on the Franco-Spanish border. 
Between the 16th and 19th centuries it was considered to be one of the most 
outstanding strongholds in the Basque Country due to its strategic position. The 
bastion system of fortification was extremely prevalent in this stronghold. It was 
one of the first Spanish towns to adopt the incipient Renaissance designs of the 
bastion. The military engineers subsequently carried out continuous fortification 
projects that enabled the structure to withstand the advances being made in 
artillery and siege tactics. After the construction of the citadel of Pamplona had 
begun in 1571, following the design of the prestigious military engineer, Jacobo 
Palear Fratín and being revised by Viceroy Vespasiano Gonzaga, the afore-
mentioned engineer undertook an ambitious project commissioned by Felipe II 
to modernise the fortifications of Fuenterrabía. Neither the plans nor the report of 
this project have been conserved, but in the year 2000, César Fernández Antuña 
published the report written by Spannocchi on the state of the fortifications of 
Fuenterrabía when he arrived to the Spanish peninsula, discovered in the 
Archivo Histórico Provincial de Zaragoza. This document conducts an in-depth 
analysis of Spannocchi’s project and how it was related to Fratín’s previous 
project. It concludes that this project encountered problems in updating the new 
bastions at the end of the 16th century, and identifies the factors which prevented 
the stronghold from being extended as was the case in Pamplona after Fratín’s 
project. 
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1 Introduction 
During the Middle Ages, offensive enclosures were more effective than 
offensive weapons. However, the development of artillery in the second half of 
the 15th century brought about significant changes in the concept, design and 
technical layout of military fortifications in order to ensure that defence forces 
would be capable of enduring a protracted siege. Taking the French example as a 
basis, Italy played a fundamental role in transforming the bastion front in the 
final years of the 15th century. 
     Renaissance military architects began to transform the ancient medieval tower 
so that it could house artillery. According to Tzonis and Lefaivre [1], bastion was 
developed, applying triangular polygonal forms in order to counteract technical 
developments in artillery, and Rocolle [2] indicates that this was the result of 
gradual developments over many years.  
     Spanish bastion design developed in 15th and 16th centuries due to the 
permanent state of war during the Middle Ages, and the influence of classical 
cultures. In most cases existing fortresses were adapted to the new defence 
requirements. However, during the 16th century, the Crown carried out the 
enormous task of fortifying and maintaining its European and American 
dominions and was unable to renovate the fortifications within the peninsula in 
line with the modern defences needed, as said by Quatrefages [3]. Initially the 
only sensitive areas of defence were the Pyrenees and subsequently the coasts, 
particularly the Mediterranean, as the Turkish danger was exacerbated during the 
years 1520 to 1530.  
2 Fuenterrabía fortifications 
Fuenterrabía’s situation, lying at the mouth of the river Bidasoa and close to Irun 
and Hendaye, had a considerable effect on the town’s social and economic 
development. As with other towns of Western Europe in the Early Middle Ages, 
the inhabitants of Fuenterrabía raised a fence or wall to defend and demarcate the 
perimeter of the settlement. Despite a lack of knowledge of its exact outline, it 
would have been dominated from the interior by a defensive tower. However, 
there was an increase in its defensive constructions following the annexation of 
Navarre by Castille due to its location on the border with France.  
     The Catholic Monarchs ordered the construction of a castle to replace the 
defensive tower, which according to Astiazaráin [4], Carlos V extended and 
restored. The medieval walls underwent several changes in order to counteract 
the effect of new guns and undermining.  
2.1 Bastioning of medieval fortifications  
Work was begun on a bastion in Fuenterrabía in 1496, a year before Master 
Ramiro López’s paradigmatic project for Salsas, however the real transformation 
took place later and the manner in which this was implemented differed from 
other fortifications. Due to the conditioning factors of the land, it was decided to 
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build a modern defensive enceinte surrounding the existing medieval perimeter. 
As may be seen in the first graphic document of the Fuenterrabía fortifications 
(Figure 1) the obsolete medieval towers were left unchanged. The first bastions 
began to be built from the second decade of the 16th century, lowering the line 
of the curtain walls, towers and battlements in order to contain large earth 
embankments. 
     When the French troops captured Fuenterrabía in 1521, a medieval walled 
perimeter and another enceinte with artillery capacity coexisted alongside each 
other [5]. According to Astiazar in [4], the Imperial and Leyva wall towers were 
developed following this assault. The other bastions built were smaller than these 
two and were heart shaped: that of the Magdalena replaced a prominent semi-
circular one, and that of the Queen embraced a circular tower from the medieval 
wall and another pentagonal tower in the new wall. 
     In 1539 Carlos V visited the fortifications at Fuenterrabía when the Castilian 
troops managed to regain the town in 1524. According to Portu [6] and Porras 
[7], he sent Captain Luís Pizaño to supervise the repair works of the damages 
inflicted. The main fortifications built were the bastion of San Nicolás (1524–
1545) and la Reina (1538–1556), thus partially modernising the fortified 
perimeter of the enceinte. 
 
 
Figure 1: The fortifications of Fuenterrabía circa 1535, Archivo General de 
Simancas, M. P. and D. XIII-55. 
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2.2 The Fratín project 
In 1571, Philip II ordered the military engineer Jacobo Palear Fratín [8] to design 
a pentagonal citadel for Pamplona in the style of that built in Antwerp [9], which 
led to a reduction in Fuenterrabía’s strategic importance. When part of the old 
city wall fell away in May the following year, the king ordered Fratín to visit the 
town fortifications. After an initial reconnaissance of the enceinte, Fratín decided 
that it favoured the enemy, and although this is not documented, it is known that 
he drew up a modernisation project. Due to the urgency and the scant budget, he 
began construction of a new bastion with considerable artillery capacity. Situated 
in the east, it dominated the mouth of the River Bidasoa, leaving defence of the 
west to the Reina and San Nicolás bastions – although these were smaller.  
 
 
Figure 2: The author’s hypothesis of the Fratín project. 
     The Fratín project consisted of a somewhat irregular fortification outline 
(Figure 2), adapting to geographic conditioning factors [10] but approaching the 
regular fortification model as far as possible. According to Cobos this principle 
laid the foundations for the excellence of the Spanish monarchy’s fortifications 
on all its frontiers [11]. The construction work on the San Felipe bastion was 
insufficient given the strategic importance of Fuenterrabía, and aware of this at 
Court they ordered a new fortified enceinte in line with Fratín’s proposal [12]. 
3 The Spannocchi project 
3.1 Engineer Spannocchi’s report 
Cámara [13] indicates an alarming lack of qualified engineers in the Iberian 
peninsula during those years. The governor of Milan and the viceroys of Naples 
and Sicily were ordered to dispatch their country’s best and, as a result, the 
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famous engineer Tiburzio Spannocchi [13] arrived in Spain. He visited 
Fuenterrabía in order to examine its fortifications as soon as he set foot on 
Spanish soil and as Fratín was in charge of supervision and inspection of the 
Mediterranean fortifications at that time [8], the king commissioned Spannocchi 




Figure 3: Spannocchi project for Fuenterrabía. Archivo Histórico Provincial 
de Zaragoza, Archivo Ducal de Híjar, Fondo Idiáquez, Sala IV, 
leg. 199. 
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     Two copies have been preserved of Spannocchi’s project for Fuenterrabía. 
One is kept in the Archivo Histórico Provincial de Zaragoza (hereinafter AHPZ) 
[15], including a precise plan, two vertical sections of the western front and an 
accompanying report in Italian. The other copy, which lacks any graphic 
documentation but contains a more extensive report is kept in the Archivo 
General de Simancas (hereinafter AGS) [16]. These documents were published 
by Fernández Antuña in 2000 [17], including transcriptions of the reports. From 
some of the documents it is clear that the essential aspects of his site analysis 
coincided with those of Fratín.  
     Spannocchi’s report provides the best preserved technical description of the 
state of the Fuenterrabía fortifications in 1580. It gives an idea of the 
obsolescence of its bastions, earthworks, bastioned fronts, and indicates the 
absence of essential elements: the moat border and the covered way in the 
western part and the moat in the eastern part towards France – which, as it was 
affected by the tides, could provide easy access for the enemy at certain times.  
     The bastions constructed following recovery of the site by the Castilian troops 
in 1524, completed in 1556, were obsolete. They had thin parapets throughout 
the enceinte and lacked interior embankments [11]. The only bastion with 
sufficient room for the earthworks was that of San Felipe, initiated by Fratín, but 
unfinished and without a moat around the whole perimeter, it was more 
prejudicial than beneficial for defence of the fortification. The foundations had 
used up most of the resources as they were laid on sandy soil, and subject to the 
ebbing of the tides and the effects of the river estuary. Furthermore, Fratín 
designed an excessively angular bastion and, for geometric reasons, the width of 
the gulley was insufficient. This defect weakened its resistance and made it 
difficult for transit of artillery pieces and garrison.  
     Spannocchi considered it unlikely that the enemy would manage to get close 
with its artillery from the north by sea, or by the river or the marshland areas. 
This line of attack could be avoided with a small garrison constructing a 
defensive tower in the area of San Telmo, on the point and dominating the sea. 
     The most likely attacks would come from land, from the west, where two hills 
at a height of approximately 40 metres situated just 300 metres from the fort 
were clearly aids from which the artillery could cause considerable damage. The 
little valleys between the hills and the slopes of Mount Jaizkibel would safeguard 
the attackers to some extent. The enemy could come from Hendaye and, by 
going round southwards having crossed the river, they could position themselves 
on this elevation looking down on the fortress from a position of safety. 
3.2 Proposals  
In his general project, Spannocchi described two quite distinct scenarios. In the 
global context of defending the western French-Spanish border, the fortresses of 
Fuenterrabía, San Sebastián, Pasajes and Pamplona formed a territorial defence 
system. In order to be really effective with the minimum number of defenders it 
was necessary to rationalise the number of forts and their magnitude or scale, 
taking into account the garrison required. Considering the efforts carried out in 
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Figure 4: Spannocchi’s project for the citadel of Cremona, 1595, AGS. M. P. 
and D. IX-51. 
Pamplona with the first pentagonal citadel, one scenario meant continuing with 
the existing fortifications in Fuenterrabía. 
     It was essential to modernise the bastions as in their current state they were 
unable to house the artillery, apart from completing the ditch, covered way and 
contrascarp throughout its perimeter. Spannocchi chose to extend the la Reina 
and San Nicolás bastions, as once the San Felipe bastion was operating and with 
the natural defence of the fort to the north and east, the western front was a 
priority. Subsequently it was possible to complete the works of the Santiago 
initiated by Gonzaga according to the Fratín project, and a final bastion was to be 
built beside the sea. Due to the scant financial resources available, instead of 
dismantling the existing masonry and reusing the material, they built new walls 
with their counterforts, to be filled with compressed and reinforced earth 
embankments the space between the two stoneworks. In addition, the parapets 
were extended, further loopholes were created and the ditches completed. In 
order to ensure effective defence, he proposed resolving the irregularities of the 
terrain, lowering the height of the hill by six or eight yards in addition to cutting 
down the existing trees a distance of 300 Castilian yards – around 250 metres. 
     The second scenario proposed would have meant a radical transformation 
both in the fortifications of Fuenterrabía and in the territorial settlement of the 
population at the Bidasoa mouth. Spannocchi drafted this option with the same 
premise that Fratín had suggested some years earlier, extending the area to the 
west to include the Cerezo hill in its interior.  
     The enceinte was extended from the bastion of la Reina to that of la 
Magdalena with similar bastioned fronts to those built for the existing perimeter. 
The length of these two western fronts increased from 400 Castilian yards – 334 
metres – to 1,000 Castilian yards – 835 metres. The most effective method was 
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 Figure 5: The authors’ hypothesis on Spannocchi’s proposals to extend the 
fortress. 
to build the new enceinte with four new bastions, which was sufficiently 
extensive to counteract the dominance of the Cerezo hill. However, Spannocchi 
indicated that another version with three new bastions which would reduce the 
cost of the works and the garrison requirements. Although the plan of 
the proposed extensions has not survived, bearing in mind the dimensions of the 
bastioned fronts used at the time, two hypotheses have been put forward by 
the authors. Based on today’s elevations of the Zimizarga neighbourhood, which 
in former times was located on the Cerezo hill, Figure 5 shows the extension 
hypotheses superimposed on the current city and compared to the outline of the 
plan preserved.  
     The extension caused many difficulties in addition to financial problems. 
Surrounding the Cerezo hill alone would mean that the fortifications would be 
too close to the Santa Engracia hill, but the solution proposed for the Cerezo 
would not be appropriate for Santa Engracia. As it was further away and at the 
other side of the backwater created by the Bidasoa, the cost would have been 
excessive not to mention the technical problems arising from the river. In both 
cases, extending the fortified enceinte would mean that the walls would be too 
close to the slopes of the Jaizkibel, and thus within range of enemy fire.  
     The costs of the works included at the end of the report provide details of the 
three above-mentioned options. The first scenario, without proposing any 
extension to the enceinte was budgeted in considerable detail with an estimate of 
74,736 ducats (Table 1), whereas Fratín’s similar proposal was valued at a total 
of 105,000 ducats – without counting any possible repairs needed. The difference 
of over 30,000 ducats was noticeable (Table 2). 
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Table 1:  Summary of Spannocchi’s improvements of the outline. 
DESCRIPTION TOTAL  
La Reina bastion 14,490 ducats 
San Nicolás bastion 11,828 ducats 
La Magdalena bastion 11,546 ducats 
San Felipe bastion 11,372 ducats 
Revellín bastion 9,120 ducats 
Casemates and dyke 16,380 ducats 
TOTAL 74,736 ducats 
Table 2:  Comparison between Fratín and Spannocchi’s outline proposals. 
DESCRIPTION FRATÍN – 1574 SPANNOCCHI – 1580 
Mountain part 60,000 ducats 37,864 ducats 
Part facing the sea (2) 25,000 ducats 20,492 ducats 
Ditches and embankments 20,000 ducats 16,380 ducats 
TOTAL 105,000 ducats 74,736 ducats 
 
     Taking the cost calculated for the new la Reina bastion as a basic estimate for 
a new one – 14,490 ducats according to Table 1 – an approach was made of the 
cost of these extensions. The cost of building four new bastions replacing the 
two western fronts would amount to 277,656 ducats (Table 3) and 227,496 
ducats building only three new bastions (Table 4). 
Table 3:  Proposal for extension of the enceinte with 4 bastions. 
DESCRIPTION TOTAL 
Bastions (4) 14,490, proportion of la Reina bastion 57,960 ducats 
Casemates (8) 2 per bastion, 4,490 per bastion 17,960 ducats 
Ditch and covered way 6,000 ducats for each distance 24,000 ducats 
Curtain walls (4) 12,000 ducats for each curtain wall between 
2 bastions 48,000 ducats 
Curtain wall replacing the bastion of San Nicolás 74,736 ducats 
Expropriation of vineyards and orchards 15,000 ducats 
Earth movements 40,000 ducats 
TOTAL 277,656 ducats 
Table 4:  Proposal for extending the enceinte with 3 bastions. 
DESCRIPTION TOTAL 
Bastions (3) 14.490, proportion of the la Reina bastion 43,380 ducats 
Casemates (6) 2 per bastion, 4.490 per bastion 13,380 ducats 
Ditch and covered way 6.000 ducats for each distance 18,000 ducats 
Curtain walls (3) 12.000 ducats each curtain wall between 2 bastions 36,000 ducats 
Surround considered superfluous 74,736 ducats 
Expropriation of vineyards and orchards 12,000 ducats 
Earth movements 30,000 ducats 
TOTAL 227,496 ducats 
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     However, Spannocchi indicated in all honesty that he was not entirely sure 
whether or not this solution would be harmful or beneficial from a defence 
perspective. The costs of execution and maintenance of the garrison in these 
proposals were excessive and it did not seem as if this option would be capable 
of avoiding enemy attack from the west.  











Mountain part 37,864 ducats 198,656 ducats 167,496 ducats 
Part facing the sea 20,492 ducats – – 
Ditches and embankments 16,380 ducats 79,000 ducats 60,000 ducats 
TOTAL 74,736 ducats 277,656 ducats 227,496 ducats 
 
4 Fortifications following the Spannocchi project 
Work on the San Felipe bastion was essential to maintain the defence until the 
assisting army arrived, and it continued in line with Fratín’s plans. This was clear 
from the siege of 1638. Spannocchi returned to Fuenterrabía in 1597 [18] and in 
1603, having been appointed Senior Engineer of the Kingdoms of Spain, and he 
drafted a report on the status of the fortifications [19] which served, following 
his death, in a new improvement planned in 1609 under the aegis of the engineer 
Jerónimo de Soto. 
     Although during Philip III’s reign no notable works were constructed [20], 
following the siege of 1638 some external works were carried out such as a 
revelin at the San Nicolás gate and a tenaille in the northwestern part. 
Throughout the 17th century improvements were made to the fortress. Although 
they never managed to extend the Santa María and San Nicolás bastions as 
Spanochi had proposed, the Santiago bastion was built and another bastion in 
front of the Magdalena tower thus strengthening the French front.  
5 Conclusions 
The Fuenterrabía fortifications were the subject of numerous projects carried out 
by military engineers throughout the 16th century. They resulted from the 
technical advances made in the search for the perfect defence machinery, namely 
the bastioned front with protected casemates in order to defend the moat.  
     On his arrival in 1580, Spannocchi revised Fratín’s proposals from 1572. 
Coinciding to a considerable extent with the latter’s analysis, he once again 
considered the possibility of extending the enceinte to the west. This solution 
was to provide three or four new bastions, which presupposed land restructuring 
and involved enormous economic costs and garrison provisions. Finally, this 
option was rejected as unsuitable in addition to the technical problems involved 
due to the proximity of the slopes of Jaizkibel and the Santa Engracia hill, and 
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another scenario was established in which only the existing bastioned enceinte 
was adapted. Therefore he detailed his proposals for reinforcing the existing 
perimeter walls with great precision, extending the la Reina and Santa Nicolás 
bastions – so that they could contain more artillery weapons – resolving in a 
more effective manner the flank of the ditch from the casemates. In addition to 
correcting Fratín’s design for the San Felipe bastion, he completed his project 
with two further bastions facing towards France. Subsequently named the 
bastions of la Magdalena and Santiago, the latter had been begun by Gonzaga 
years before, and was still under construction on the ground. Despite the 
difficulties of building, due to the tides and the river estuary, he believed that 
their construction was a necessity.  
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